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  Salafis  at  War  in  Syria:  Logics  of  Fragmentation  and  Realignment    Thomas  Pierret    Introduction     By  March  2011,  Salafism  was  a  very  marginal  force  on  Syria’s  religious  scene,  as  its   growing   popular   appeal   during   the   previous   decade   had   been  matched   by  increasing   state   repression.1  Following   the   outbreak   of   the   civil  war,   however,  Salafi   factions  rapidly  became  the  dominant  force  among  the  insurgency,  to  the  extent   that   by   October   2013   five   of   them   featured   among   the   seven   most  powerful   rebel   groups   in   the   country,   totalling   several   dozens   of   thousands   of  fighters:  two  of  them  were  offspring  of  the  Jihadi  Islamic  State  in  Iraq  (Jabhat  al-­‐Nusra,  hereafter  al-­‐Nusra,  and  the  Islamic  State  in  Iraq  and  Sham,  ISIS),  and  the  three   others  would   soon   become   the   founding   factions   of   the  more   pragmatic  Islamic  Front  (Ahrar  al-­‐Sham,  the  Army  of  Islam,  and  Suqur  al-­‐Sham),  along  with  the  Islamist,  but  non-­‐Salafi  Tawhid  Brigade.2    To  a  certain  extent,  the  spectacular  rise  of  Salafism  in  Syria  was  function  of  this  doctrine’s   inherent   features:   in  particular,  an  exclusive  definition  of   the  Islamic  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Thomas Pierret, Religion and State in Syria. The Sunni Ulama from Coup to Revolution, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 108-109. 
2 Joshua Landis, ‘Syria’s top five insurgent leaders, Syria Comment, 1 October 2013. 
	  faith   that   perfectly   suits   the   context   of   sectarian   polarisation   -­‐   Sunnis   versus  Alawites   -­‐   that   characterises   the  Syrian  war,   in  addition   to   the  broader,   Sunni-­‐Shia   dimension   the   conflict   has   acquired   as   a   result   of   the   involvement   of  regional  actors.3  Salafism’s  newly  acquired  hegemony  also  reflected  the  revenge  of  the  country’s  peripheries  over  urban  centres,  as  the  villages,  provincial  towns  and  popular  suburbs  that  had  been  home  to  most  of  the  pre-­‐2011  shadowy  Salafi  networks  have  also  provided  the  bulk  of  the  current  insurgent  leadership.4      At   the   same   time,   however,   Syria’s   current   ‘military   Salafism’   is   a   largely  imported   phenomenon.   Whereas   before   2011   Ba‘thist   authoritarianism   had  succeeded   in   curtailing   foreign   interferences   in   Syria’s   religious   scene,   the  subsequent  collapse  of  state  control  over  vast  swathes  of  the  country  opened  the  latter   to   the   influence   of   transnational   Salafi   networks   based   in   Iraq   and   the  Arabian   Peninsula.   Thanks   to   their   efficiency   and   financial   means,   these  networks  rapidly  established  solid  strongholds  among  rebel  groups  in  dire  need  of  external  support.      Foreign   support   gave   Syrian   Salafi   factions   a   military   weight   that   was  disproportionate   to   the   actual   social   anchorage   of   their   religious   doctrine.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 ICG (International Crisis Group), Tentative Jihad: Syria’s Fundamentalist Opposition, Middle East 
Report 131, 12 October 2012, p. 5. 
4 In that respect, it is remarkable that the few sizeable Islamist groups with significant roots in the 
urban middle-class (Fa-staqim Kama Umirt in Aleppo, Shabab al-Huda in Damascus) are not Salafi 
(interview with ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj, Gaziantep, 10 January 2014). 
	  Indeed,   given   the   weakness   and   disorganisation   of   the   Salafi   scene   in   pre-­‐revolutionary   Syria,   the   embrace   of   Salafism   by  many   opposition   fighters   long  remained   superficial,   if   not   opportunistic.5  Of   course,   this   situation   gradually  changed   as   foreign   Salafi   donors   encouraged   genuine   proselytising   among  insurgent   groups   and   civilian   communities.   However,   given   the   enormous  material   needs   resulting   from   prolonged   warfare,   foreign   support   will   long  remain  a  key  determinant  of  the  structure  and  outlook  of  Syrian  Salafism.    External  Salafi  involvement  in  a  conflict  through  funding  and  foreign  fighters  has  been  a   recurring  pattern  of  Muslim  politics   since   the  Afghan  war   in   the  1980s.  However,   the   Syrian   crisis   has   brought   about   a   situation   that   is   largely  unprecedented,  namely,  the  fact  that  competition  among  Salafi  support  networks  of  conflicting  political  orientations  −   Jihadis,  political/Haraki,  and  quietist  −  has  profoundly  affected  the  structure  of  the  insurgency  as  a  whole.  Such  competition  was  not  absent   in  1980s  Afghanistan,6  but   it  had  a  marginal   impact  outside  the  small   community   of   foreign   fighters,   and   the   Afghan   insurgency   remained  principally   structured   by   local   dividing   lines.   In   Syria,   on   the   contrary,   the  leading  insurgent  fronts  were  established  at  the  instigation  of  -­‐  or  with  the  goal  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 ICG, Tentative Jihad, p. 5. 
6 Bernard Rougier, Everyday Jihad. The Rise of Militant Islam Among Palestinians in Lebanon, 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007, p. 78-79. 
	  in  mind   to  attract   support   from   -­‐   a   specific   segment  of   the   transnational   Salafi  sphere.7      The  involvement  of  the  entire  spectrum  of  regional  Salafi  networks  in  the  Syrian  conflict  also  contrasted  with  the  situation  of  the  decade  that  preceded  the  Arab  Awakening.   Indeed,  whereas   in   the  1980s   and  1990s   the  Afghan,  Bosnian,   and  Chechen   Jihads   had   been   relatively   uncontroversial   causes   in   Gulf  monarchies  and   had   consequently   attracted   both   militant   and   mainstream   support,   fund-­‐raising  for  Salafi  militancy  abroad  had  been  gradually  driven  underground  after  2001   as   a   result   of   the   post-­‐9/11   US   ‘war   on   terror’   and   al-­‐Qaeda’s   terrorist  campaign  on  Saudi  soil.8      A  factor  that  attenuated  the  bitterness  of  intra-­‐Salafi  rivalries  in  the  jihads  of  the  1980s  and  1990s  was  the  fact  that  they  were  territorial  wars  against  non-­‐Muslim  enemies  on  the  outskirt  of  the  umma,  which  meant  that  their  outcomes  were  not  directly  consequential  for  Middle  Eastern  societies.  On  the  contrary,  the  current  Syrian  conflict  has  been  taking  place  at  the  heart  of  the  region  and  started  as  part  of  a  revolutionary  wave  that  directly  threatened  all  Arab  regimes.  Such  a  context  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Ideological divisions among Salafi networks of support are only one aspect of the broader 
fragmentation of the Syrian insurgency’s sources of funding, a situation that has significantly hindered 
attempts at unifying rebel groups. See Afshon Ostovar and Will McCants, The Rebel Alliance. Why 
Syria’s Armed Opposition Has Failed to Unifiy, CNA Strategic Studies, March 2013. 
8 Thomas Hegghammer, Violence and Pan-Islamism since 1979, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 
	  generated  acute  awareness  among  Salafis   that   the  war’s  political  consequences  would   inevitably   extend   beyond   Syrian   borders,   and   that   whatever  interpretation  of  Salafism  would  come  out  on  top  in  the  country  would  thereby  acquire  a  major  advantage  region-­‐wide.      This   chapter   presents   the   different   nexuses   of   local   military   commanders,  foreign  private  networks  of  support,  and  in  some  cases  state  sponsors,  that  stand  behind  the  main  Syrian  insurgent  coalitions  of  Salafi  obedience.  Each  of  the  first  four  sections  corresponds  to  one  of  the  rebel  fronts  established  in  2012  in  order  to   promote   a   specific   interpretation   of   Salafism:   the   Jihadi   al-­‐Nusra,   the   ‘Salafi  lite’/Haraki  Syrian  Islamic  Front,  the  Haraki  Syria  Islamic  Liberation  Front,  and  the   ‘quietist’   Front   for   Authenticity   and   Development.   The   last   two   sections  analyse  the  circumstances  of  the  reshuffling  of  the  Syrian  Salafi  scene  throughout  2013  with   the  merger   of   the   Syrian   Islamic   Front   and   Syria   Islamic   Liberation  Front  into  the  Islamic  Front,  the  split  between  al-­‐Nusra  and  ISIS,  and  the  growing  polarisation  between  the  latter  and  all  other  insurgent  factions.      As  one  of  the  most  pressing  strategic  issues  worldwide,  Syrian  Salafi  groups  have  been   intensively   scrutinised   over   the   last   years.   This   chapter  makes   extensive  use   of   the   abundant   secondary   material   published   on   the   subject   and  complement   it   with   primary   sources   to   provide   a   dynamic   map   of   the   Syrian  Salafi  scene.  The  aim  is  not  only  to  detail  the  different  forces  on  the  ground  and  their  respective  transnational  connections,  but  also  to  highlight  the  evolutionary  
	  character   of   these   nexuses’   strategies   and   identities   in   the   face   of   changing  circumstances.      Fronting  for  the  Islamic  State  in  Iraq:  Jabhat  al-­‐Nusra    In   a   context   like   Syria’s   civil  war,  where   armed   struggle   is  part   of   the  political  mainstream,   what   sets   Jihadis   apart   from   other   Salafis   is   their   embrace   of   a  military  agenda  that  extends  beyond  the  spatial  and  temporal  boundaries  of  the  Syrian   uprising: 9   That   kind   of   agenda   was   illustrated   by   ISIS’   two-­‐front  insurgency   in   Iraq   and   Syria,   and   by   al-­‐Nusra’s   establishment   of   a   Lebanese  branch   in   late   2013. 10   Besides   the   routinised   use   of   suicide   bombings,  transnational   military   activism   has   been   the   one   main   distinctive   feature   of  Jihadi   groups   in  Syria.   It  has  been  more  distinctive   than   their  project  of   a  new  Caliphate,   which   has   been   promoted  more   vocally   and   consistently,   for   half   a  century,   by   the   non-­‐Salafi/non-­‐Jihadi   Hizb   al-­‐Tahrir   (‘Liberation   Party’).  Transnational   military   activism   has   also   be   more   specific   to   Jihadis   than   the  recruitment   of   foreign   fighters:   Jihadi   groups   have   been   the   main,   but   not  exclusive,  recipients  of  such  foreign  volunteers:  the  Umma  Brigade,  a  moderate  Islamist   group   based   in   the   province   of   Idlib   which   initially   fought   under   the  Syrian  flag  and  maintained  close  relations  with  the  Free  Syrian  Army  (FSA),  was  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 François Burgat and Romain Caillet, ‘Une guérilla “islamiste” ? Les composantes idéologiques de la 
révolte armée’, in François Burgat (ed.), Pas de printemps pour la Syrie. Les clés pour comprendre les 
acteurs et les défis de la crise (2011−2013), Paris: La Découverte, 2013, p. 60. 
10 Aron Lund, ‘Osama al-Shehabi: An al-Qaeda Leader in Lebanon’, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 19 December 2013. 
	  established  by  veteran  of  the  Libyan  civil  war  Mahdi  Harati;11  in  the  context  of  its  war  against  ISIS  in  early  2014,  the  Islamic  Front  challenged  the  latter’s  claim  to  be   the   muhajirin   (‘migrants’)   organisation   par   excellence   through   a   media  campaign   featuring   interviews   with   foreign   fighters   entitled   ‘I   fight   with   the  Islamic  Front’.12      Jihadism  became  a  visible  component  of  the  Syrian  insurgency  in  January  2012  with  the  establishment  of  jabhat  al-­‐nusra  li-­‐ahl  al-­‐sham  (‘The  Support  Front  for  the  People  of   the  Levant’).  Al-­‐Nusra  was   set  up  by  Abu  Muhammad  al-­‐Jolani,   a  Syrian  militant  about  whom  we  possess  very  little  reliable  information,  on  behalf  of   Abu  Bakr   al-­‐Baghdadi’s   Islamic   State   of   Iraq   (ISI),   at   the   time   an   unruly   al-­‐Qaeda   affiliate.13  Although   al-­‐Nusra’s   ties   with   ISI   were   kept   secret   until   al-­‐Baghdadi   disclosed   them   in   April   2013,   they  were   evoked   early   on   by   the   US  government.14    Al-­‐Nusra’s   early   beginning   (by   January   2012,   the  militarisation   of   the   uprising  was   less   than  six-­‐month  old)  made   the  group   the   first   rebel  organisation   to  be  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Mary Fitzgerald, ‘The Syrian Rebels’ Libyan Weapon’, Foreign Policy, 9 August 2012. 
12 See for instance ‘Kuwayti … ana mujahid ma‘a al-jabhat al-islamiyya (Kuwaiti … I fight with the 
Islamic Front), 14 January 2014, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UydqhXFyVis. 
13 On tensions between al-Qaeda and ISI before 2011, see Cole Bunzel, ‘The Islamic State of 
Disobedience: al-Baghdadi Triumphant’, Jihadica, 5 October 2013. 
14 ICG, Tentative Jihad, p. 10-11; Aron Lund, Syrian Jihadism, Swedish Institute for International 
Affairs UI Brief 13, 14 September 2012, pp. 25-30. 
	  explicitly   created  outside,   or  more  exactly,   against,   the   loose   framework  of   the  FSA.   At   a   time   when   most   armed   groups   were   still   pledging   to   fight   for   a  democratic  revolution,  al-­‐Nusra  mimicked  its  Iraqi  matrix  by  adopting  an  ultra-­‐Islamist,   sectarian   and   anti-­‐Western   rhetoric,   concealing   the   identity   of   its  leaders,   and   carrying   out   spectacular   suicide   bombings   against   government  targets  located  in  densely  populated  urban  areas.  For  several  months,  al-­‐Nusra’s  attitude  was   seen   as   so   detrimental   to   the   image   of   the   revolution   that  many  Syrian   opponents   suggested   that   the   group   was   in   fact   a   creature   of   Asad’s  intelligence.15    The  situation  began  to  change   in  the  summer  of  2012,  as  al-­‐Nusra’s  manpower  rapidly   increased   through   the   recruitment   of   Syrian   fighters,   including   many  defectors  from  other  rebel  factions.  This  success  resulted  from  the  Jihadi  group’s  combativeness  against  regime  forces,  discipline  in  a  context  of  military  stalemate  that  was  driving  many  rebel  units  to  go  rogue,  and  efficient  management  of  relief  activities  among  local  communities.16  These  qualities  were  not  only  a  by-­‐product  of   Jihadi   ideology,   but   arguably   owed   much   to   the   nature   of   the   group’s  leadership,  a  cohesive  vanguard  of   long-­‐standing  militants   that  gave  al-­‐Nusra  a  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 ICG, Tentative Jihad, p. 11-12 ; Burgat and Caillet, ‘Une guérilla “islamiste” ?’, p. 72; 76. 
16 See for instance Rania Abouzeid, ‘Aleppo’s Deadly Stalemate: A Visit to Syria’s Divided 
Metropolis’, Time, 14 November 2012. 
	  distinct  advantage  over  most  other  rebel   factions,  whose  fragmented  command  structures  had  been  hastily  improvised  from  2011  on.17      Within   less   than   a   year,   al-­‐Nusra   had   changed   tremendously.   From   a   small,  secretive   organisation   mostly   made   up   of   foreigners,   the   group   had   morphed  into  a  several   thousand-­‐strong  guerrilla   force  of  predominantly  Syrian   fighters.  The   ‘nationalisation’   of   al-­‐Nusra   coincided   with   the   adoption   of   a   more  pragmatic  approach.  In  December  2012,  a  Syrian  commander  of  al-­‐Nusra  denied  the   fact   that   the   latter   had   ‘some   other   goal   elsewhere’   than   in   Syria.18  This  statement  was  at  least  indicative  of  the  group’s  eagerness  to  tailor  its  discourse  to   a   Syrian   audience   that   had   little   appetite   for   global   Jihad.   In   an   address  released  the  same  month,  al-­‐Jolani  adopted  a  conciliatory  tone  by  stressing  the  need  to  preserve  good  relations  with  other  rebel  groups  and  to  ‘turn  a  blind  eye  on   their   errors’.19  In  practice,   al-­‐Nusra   joined   forces  with   affiliates  of   the  more  mainstream  Syrian  Islamic  Front  and  Syria  Islamic  Liberation  Front  to  set  up  the  Sharia   Committee   (al-­‐hay’a   al-­‐shar‘iyya),   a   judicial-­‐executive   authority   whose  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 On the influence of pre-war social networks on the success of insurgent groups, see Paul Staniland, 
Networks of Rebellion. Explaining Insurgent Cohesion and Collapse. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2014. 
18 Rania Abouzeid, ‘Interview with official of Jabhat al-Nusra, Time, 25 December 2012, 
http://world.time.com/2012/12/25/interview-with-a-newly-designated-syrias-jabhat-al-nusra/. 
19 Abu Muhammad al-Jolani, ‘Ahl al-sham fadaynakum bi-arwahina (O People of the Levant, We Will 
Sacrifice Ourselves for Your Sake)’, 27 December 2012, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LmBRUakQJRA.   
	  stated   goal   was   to   enforce   a   modicum   of   (Islamic)   order   in   the   rebel-­‐held  districts  of  Aleppo.20    In  November  2012,  al-­‐Nusra’s  denunciation  of  the  Syrian  National  Coalition  (the  main  political  arm  of  the  opposition  abroad)  as  a  ‘conspiratorial  project’  served  as   a   reminder   that   the   Jihadi   organisation   could   certainly   not   qualify   as  ‘moderate’.21  Despite  that,  however,  its  image  had  dramatically  improved  among  the   rest   of   the   opposition,   as   illustrated   by   the   quasi-­‐unanimous   reprobation  (including  among  the  National  Coalition  itself)  that  met  al-­‐Nusra’s  blacklisting  as  a  terrorist  organisation  by  the  US  government  in  December  2012.22         ‘ J ihadi  Lite’:   Ahrar  al-­‐Sham  and  the  Syrian  Islamic  Front    The   Syrian   Islamic   Front   (al-­‐jabhat   al-­‐islamiyyat   al-­‐suriyya,   hereafter   SIF)  was  established   in  December   2012.   Contrary   to   al-­‐Nusra,   a   centralised   vanguardist  structure  that  was  a  ‘front’  only  in  name,  the  SIF  was  a  genuine  coalition  of  pre-­‐existing  groups  stemming  from  the  country’s  different  provinces.23  The  purpose  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 Thomas Pierret, ‘Implementing “Sharia” in Syria’s liberated provinces’, The Foundation for Law, 
Justice and Society, 7 August 2013. 
21 Aron Lund, ‘Aleppo and the battle for the Syrian revolution’s soul’, Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, 4 December 2012. 
22 Al-Safir, 12 December 2012, http://assafir.com/#!/ArticleWindow.aspx?ArticleID=295822. 
23 For more details on the SIF’s components, see Aron Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents: the Rise of the 
Syrian Islamic Front, Swedish Institute for International Affairs UI Brief 17, 17 March 2013. 
	  of   their   unification   was   not   so   much   tactical   coordination24,   but   fund-­‐raising  through   the   creation   of   a   ‘brand’   that   would   clarify   the   identity   of   the   front’s  components   in   the   eyes   of   potential   donors,   and   magnify   these   components’  military   weight   thanks   to   a   single   logo   featuring   on   all   the   videos   of   their  operations.      From  the  onset,  the  SIF  was  overwhelmingly  dominated  by  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham  (‘the  Freemen   of   the   Levant’),   which   by   June   2012   had   become   one   of   the   most  powerful   insurgent   organisations   in   the   country.   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham   presented   an  extremely  ambiguous  profile  that  could  be  labelled  as  ‘Jihadi  lite’.      The  founding  leadership  of  most  SIF  affiliates  was  firmly  rooted  in  the  pre-­‐2011  Jihadi  community,  in  particular  among  former  inmates  of  the  prison  of  Seydnaya  
−  Syria’s  ‘Jihadi  Academy’  −  who  were  released  by  the  regime  in  the  months  that  followed   the   uprising   of   March   2011.25 Such was the case of Ahrar al-Sham’s 
leader Hasan   ‘Abbud   (Abu   Abdallah   al-­‐Hamawi),   chief   religious   scholar  Muhammad   Ayman   Abu   al-­‐Tut   (Abu   al-­‐Abbas   al-­‐Shami),   and   emir   in   Aleppo  Muhammad  Bahaya  (Abu  Khalid  al-­‐Suri),   a  veteran   Jihadi  with  personal   ties   to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 Tactical coordination between insurgent groups is usually dealt with at the local level by the FSA’s 
Military Councils and ad hoc operation rooms. 
25 Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents, passim; Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj, ‘A-salafiyya wal-salafiyyun fi 
suriyya: min al-islah ila al-jihad (Salafism and Salafis in Syria: From Reform to Jihad)’, Al Jazeera, 20 
May 2013. 
	  al-­‐Qaeda  leader  Ayman  al-­‐Zawahiri.2627  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham’s  anchorage  within  Jihadi  networks   extended   beyond   Syrian   borders:   one   of   its   early   muftis   was   a  Jordanian,28  and   until   the   summer   of   2012,   the   group  was   said   to   be   the  main  magnet  for  (Arab)  foreign  fighters  in  the  north  of  Syria.29    In  spite  of  this,  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham’s  strategy  immediately  set  it  apart  from  al-­‐Nusra.  First,   the   group   insisted   it   was   totally   independent   from   any   foreign  organisation,  a  claim  buttressed  by  the  fact  that,  contrary  to  al-­‐Nusra,  it  was  not  endorsed   by   al-­‐Qaeda-­‐related   online   forums.   In   May   2013,   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham  denounced   al-­‐Nusra’s   decision   to   officially   pledge   allegiance   to   Ayman   al-­‐Zawahiri,  warning  against  the  dangers  of  ‘regionalising  the  conflict’  and  ‘bringing  in  other  parties’.30      Second,   although   the   leadership   of   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham   conformed   to   the   vanguard  model  and  consequently  enjoyed  a  tightly  institutionalised  command  structure,31  the   group   expanded   along   a   distinctly   ‘parochial’   model   by   securing   the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
 
27 Aron Lund, ‘Say Hello to the Islamic Front’ and ‘Who and what was Abu Khalid al-Suri?’,Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 22 November 2013 and 24 February 2014; Abd al-Rahman al-
Hajj Ibrahim in al-Hayat, 28 February 2014.  
28 Al-Quds al-‘Arabi, 7 November 2013, http://www.alquds.co.uk/?p=101292. 
29 Lund, Syrian Jihadism, p. 31.  
30 Aron Lund, ‘Major salafi faction criticizes Jabhat al-Nosra’, Syria Comment, 4 May 2013. 
31 Interview with Abd al-Rahman al-Hajj, Istanbul, 7 January 2014. 
	  allegiance   of   entire   pre-­‐existing   local   rural   battalions   (kata’ib)   that   kept   their  names  and,  initially  at  least,  only  superficially  embraced  the  Salafi  orientation  of  their  umbrella  organisation.32      Third,   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham’s   posture   towards   non-­‐Jihadi   partners   was   far   more  flexible   than   that   of   al-­‐Nusra.   Although   it   expressed   no   sympathy   for   the  Western-­‐backed  opposition  in  exile,  it  joined  the  Syria  Revolutionaries  Front,33  a  short-­‐lived   rebel   coalition   whose   politburo   included   Muslim-­‐Brotherhood  affiliated   members   of   the   Syrian   National   Council,   the   National   Coalition’s  ancestor. 34   The   group   also   distanced   itself   from   al-­‐Nusra’s   aforementioned  rhetorical   onslaught   against   the   National   Coalition,35  and   although   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham  never  integrated  FSA  structures,  it  cooperated  with  the  latter’s  provincial  Military  Councils,  and  representatives  of   the  movement  attended  a  high-­‐profile  meeting   convened   by   FSA   Chief   of   staff   Salim   Idris   in   Ankara   in   June   2013.36  Even   more   remarkably,   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham   rapidly   opened   channels   of  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Al-Hayat, 21 August 2012, http://alhayat.com/Details/427912; on the parochial model, see Staniland, 
Networks of Rebellion.  
33 Not to be confused with the coalition of the same name established in late 2013 by FSA commander 
Jamal Ma‘ruf. 
34 Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents, p. 29; on the Muslim Brotherhood’s occasional funding of Ahrar al-
Sham, see Raphaël Lefèvre, ‘The Syrian Brotherhood’s armed struggle’, Carnegie Middle East Center, 
14 December 2012. 
35 Lund, ‘Aleppo and the battle’. 
36 Al Jazeera, 20 June 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=simuv4yIVgU&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
	  communication  with  Western  states,37  arguably  as  a  means  to  reassure  the  latter  about  its  agenda  and  consequently  avoid  being  blacklisted.      Fourth,   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham’s   political   platform   was   consistently   presented   in   an  ambiguous  manner  that  did  not  reflect  ideological  flexibility,  but  testified  to  the  movement’s   feeling   of   embarrassment   towards   its   own   doctrinaire   agenda.  Jihadi  ideologues  who  scrutinised  the  charter  of  the  SIF  formulated  polite  regrets  at   the   fact   that  although  not  explicitly  compromising  on  key   issues  such  as   the  Islamic   state   and   the   legal   inferiority   of   non-­‐Muslims,   the   document   featured  vague   phrasing   that   left   the   door   open   for   various   interpretations.38  In   an   Al  Jazeera  interview,  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham’s  leader  ‘Abbud  showed  utterly  uncomfortable  
−  and  eventually  silent  −  about  the  specifics  of  the  state  his  movement  aimed  to  establish.39    Ahrar   al-­‐Sham’s   relative   pragmatism   must   be   understood   in   the   light   of   the  unique  context   in  which   it  emerged,   that   is,   the  Arab  Awakening.  Starting  with  Sayyid  Qutb  in  the  1960s,  the  militant  Islamists’  vision  of  politics  was  shaped  by  a   highly   elitist,   ‘vanguardist’   model   well   illustrated   by   the   name   of   the   Syrian  group   in  which   the  elders  among  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham’s   cadre  had   fought  during   the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents, p. 18. 
38 Abu Basir al-Tartusi, ‘A Note on the Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front’ (in Arabic), Jihadology, 22 
January 2013; Iyad Qunaybi, ‘A Look at the Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front’ (in Arabic), 
Jihadology, 22 January 2013. 
39 Al Jazeera, 9 June 2013, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GRPb4nFU2UA. 
	  1979−82   insurgency:   the   ‘Fighting   Vanguard’.   Likewise,   the   name   ‘al-­‐Qaeda’  refers   to   a   solid   ‘basis’   of   committed   militants.   This   elitist   model   was   itself   a  product   of   specific   historical   circumstances,   namely   the   radicalisation   of  Islamism  in  the  face  of  single-­‐party  regimes  suppressing  popular  participation  in  politics,   the   worldwide   fashion   of   armed   (especially   left-­‐wing,   Guevarist)  vanguardism  in  the  1960s-­‐1970s,  and  the  crystallisation  of  global  Jihadi  ideology  among  a  small  community  of  Arab  veterans  of  the  Afghan  war  in  the  1990s.  On  the  contrary,  the  Arab  revolutions  of  2011  confronted  radical  Islamists  with  the  fact   that   ‘ people   power’    could   bring   about   actual   political   change.  Acknowledgement  of  the  political  agency  of  the  masses  and  of  the  fact  that  they  could   not   be   expected   to   unanimously   agree   with   a   rigorist   Salafi   platform  explains   the   SIF’s   promise   to   adopt   ‘gradualism’   in   the   implementation   of   its  agenda.40  Tellingly,   ‘Abbud   later   derided   al-­‐Nusra’s   maximalist   agenda   as   “the  jihad  of  the  elites”.41     The   ideological   revisions   entailed   by   the  Arab  Awakening   among   some   radical  Islamists   also   found   an   illustration   in   the  writings   of   Abu  Basir   al-­‐Tartusi,   aka  Abd  al-­‐Mun‘im  Mustafa  Halima  (b.  1959),  a  leading  Syrian,  London-­‐based  Jihadi  theoretician   who   endorsed   the   charter   of   the   SIF.42  Before   that,   al-­‐Tartusi’s  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 ‘Charter of the Syrian Islamic Front’, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 21 January 
2013. 
41 Al-Safir, 19 May 2014, http://www.assafir.com/Article/5/351144/MostRead.	  
42 Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents, p. 21. 
	  fascination  with  Syria’s  popular  insurgency  had  led  him  to  praise  the  FSA,  rebuke  the   latter’s   Jihadi   detractors,   and   reproach   al-­‐Nusra   for   its   secrecy   and  extremism.43    The  pragmatic  stance  of  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham  was  also  related   to   its  proximity   to   the  Turkish-­‐Qatari  axis.  The  movement’s  founding  meeting  reportedly  took  place  in  Istanbul,44  which   suggests   early   liaison  with   the   Turkish   intelligence.   Later   on,  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham’s  SIF  acknowledged  financial  support  from  IHH,  a  Turkish  charity  closely   tied   to   the   AKP   government,   as   well   as   from   the   Qatar   Charity.45  According   to   a  media   officer   of   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham,   the   latter’s   participation   in   the  June  2013  FSA  meeting  in  Ankara  was  a  result  of  encouragement  from  the  ‘Qatari  brothers’,   whose   chief   client   in   the   National   Coalition  Mustafa   al-­‐Sabbagh  was  jointly  chairing  the  meeting  alongside  General  Idris.46      The  partnership  between  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham’s  seasoned   Jihadi   leaders  and  regional  governments  was  probably  brokered  by  the  private  Salafi  networks  who,  initially  at   least,   provided   the   movement   with   much   of   its   financial   resources.   In   that  respect,  another  major  difference  between  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham  and  al-­‐Nusra  was  that  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Burgat and Caillet, ‘Une guérilla “islamiste” ?’, p. 72, 76; Cole Bunzel, ‘Jihadism’s Widening 
Internal Divide: Intellectual Infighting Heats Up’, Jihadica, 29 January 2013. 
44 Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents, p. 30. 
45 Ibid., p. 25. 
46 Al Jazeera, 20 June 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=simuv4yIVgU&feature=youtube_gdata_player. 
	  whereas  overt  support  for  the  latter  across  the  region  remained  minimal  outside  the  radical  underground,  the  former  was  immediately  and  publicly  endorsed  by  well-­‐known  figures  in  Kuwait.  Taking  advantage  of  their  country’s  very  high  GDP  per   capita   and   lax   policies   towards   fundraising,   these   activists   did   not   only  collect  donations  in  the  emirate,  but  also  turned  the  latter  into  a  hub  for  money  coming  from  neighbouring  countries  and  in  particular  from  Saudi  Arabia,  where  private  fund  raising  for  Syrian  insurgents  was  officially  banned  in  May  2012.47    Ahrar  al-­‐Sham’s  Kuwaiti  supporters  were  Haraki  Salafis  known  for  their  hostility  to  Saudi  Arabia  and  good  relations  with  Qatar  and  Turkey.48  Umma  Party  leader  Hakim  al-­‐Mutayri,  reportedly  participated  in  the  Istanbul  meeting  that  led  to  the  creation   of   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham,49  which   subsequently   benefited   from   fund   raising  campaigns   run  by   figures   such  as   former  MP  Walid  al-­‐Tabtaba’i,   the  extremely  popular   TV   preacher   Nabil   al-­‐‘Awdi   (the   most   influential   tweeter   on   Syria   in  2012)50  and  his  friend  Shafi  al-­‐‘Ajami,  as  well  as  Hajjaj  al-­‐‘Ajami,  the  head  of  the  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Elizabeth Dickinson, ‘Playing with fire: Why private Gulf financing for Syria’s extremist rebels risks 
igniting sectarian conflict at home’, Saban Center for Middle East Policy 16, 6 December 2013, p. 21-
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48 See Zoltan Pall’s chapter in this volume as well as Carine Lahoud-Tatar, Islam et Politique au 
Koweït, Paris: PUF, 2011, p. 190-211 
49 Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents, p. 30. 
50 Marc Lynch, Deen Freelon and Sean Aday, Syria’s Socially Mediated Civil War, Washington: 
United States Institute of Peace, 2014, p. 23. 
	  Popular  Committee  for  the  Support  to  the  Syrian  Revolution.51  Tellingly,  whereas  the   aforementioned   fundraisers  were  barred   from  operating   in   Saudi  Arabia,52  their  representatives  in  Qatar  were  working  out  in  the  open.53    The  Sururiyya   Goes  Syrian:  The  Syria  Islamic  Liberation  Front       Besides   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham   and   its   SIF,   donations   collected   by   Haraki   Salafis   in  Kuwait   also   went   to   rebel   factions   affiliated   with   another   coalition,   the   Syria  Islamic   Liberation   Front   (jabha   tahrir   suriyya   al-­‐islamiyya,   hereafter   SILF),  established   in   September   2012.54  Although   it   was   part   of   the   same   regional  alignment,  the  SILF  presented  several  differences  with  the  SIF.    First,  whereas  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham  was  the  unchallenged  mainstay  of   the  SIF,  power  within  the  SILF  was  evenly  distributed  between  its  four  main  components:  Suqur  al-­‐Sham   in   Idlib,   the   Islam  Brigade   in  Damascus,   the  Faruq  Battalions   in  Homs,  and  the  Tawhid  Brigade  in  Aleppo.      Second,  whereas  the  SIF   leadership  was  clearly  dominated  by  Salafi   ‘graduates’  of  the  Seydnaya  prison,  the  profiles  of  SILF  commanders  were  more  diverse,  to  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Lund, Syria’s Salafi Insurgents, p. 29; ICG, Tentative Jihad, p. 30; Dickinson, Playing with Fire. 
52 See Hajjaj al-‘Ajami’s account on Youtube, 19 July 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=rWKYy1bG7qA. 
53 Dickinson, Playing with Fire, p. 8, 10. 
54 Tweet by Shafi al-‘Ajami, 13 June 2013. 
	  the   extent   that   major   components   of   the   front   were   not   Salafi.   Tawhid’s   first  military   commander   ‘Abd  al-­‐Qadir  Salih,  who  died   in  an  airstrike   in  November  2013,  was  a  small  merchant  affiliated  with  the  Tabligh,  a  non-­‐Salafi  and  apolitical  missionary   movement   based   in   South   Asia,55  and   his   brigade   initially   placed  itself  under  the  spiritual  guidance  of  the  League  of  the  Syrian  Ulama’s  president  Muhammad  Ali  al-­‐Sabuni,  a  non-­‐Salafi  scholar  enjoying  close  relations  with  the  Muslim   Brotherhood.56     The   Faruq   Battalions   were   run   in   a   more   collegial  fashion  by  very  diverse  figures  who  had  no  record  of  Jihadi  activism:  their  early  figurehead  was  Lieutenant  ‘Abd  al-­‐Razzaq  Tlass,  the  first  army  officer  to  defect  in  June  2011;  real  power  was  said  to  be  in  the  hands  of  Amjad  al-­‐Bitar,  a  religious  sheikh  who  owed  his  influence  in  the  group  to  his  connections  with  fund-­‐raising  networks   in   the   Gulf,   but  whose   Salafi   credentials  were   questionable;   by   June  2013,   al-­‐Faruq   was   led   by   Osama   al-­‐Junaydi,   a   young   lawyer   from   the   city   of  Homs.57    Former   Salafi   inmates   of   the   Seydnaya   prison   were   present   in   the   SILF  leadership.  Two  of  them,  Ahmad  ‘Abu  Isa’  al-­‐Sheikh  and  Zahran  ‘Allush,  were  the  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
55 See his profile in the New York Times, 1 February 2013, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/02/world/middleeast/the-saturday-profile-hajji-marea-a-rebel-
commander-in-syria-holds-reins-of-war.html. 
56 Thomas Pierret, ‘Les oulémas : une hégémonie religieuse ébranlée par la révolution’, in François 
Burgat (ed.), Pas de printemps pour la Syrie, Paris: La Découverte, 2013, p. 103. 
57 Interview with Faruq Battalions leader Osama al-Junaydi, Al Jazeera, 17 June 2013, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IJIda5B1QHU; ICG, Tentative Jihad, p. 5. 
	  respective   commanders   of   Suqur   al-­‐Sham  and   the   Islam  Brigade.58  However,   it  seems  that  neither  al-­‐Sheikh  nor  ‘Allush  were  as  integrated  into  pre-­‐2011  Jihadi  networks   as   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham’s   commanders   were.   This   plausibly   explains   the  more  localised  character  of  their  organisations  as  well  as  their  comparative  lack  of  institutionalisation  and  consequent  reliance  on  kinship  relations.  By  2014,  all  of   the   Islam  Brigade’s  most  visible   figures  were  members  of   the   ‘Allush   family,  with  Zahran  as  supreme  commander,  and  two  cousins,  Muhammad  and  Islam,  as  head  of  the  politburo  and  military  spokesman,  respectively.    A  third  major  difference  between  the  SIF  and  the  SILF  was  the  latter’s  distinctly  more  moderate  outlook.  By  the  establishment  of  the  SILF  in  September  2012,  all  its  major  components,  except  for  the  Islam  Brigade,  had  the  Syrian  national  flag  on   their   logos.   Despite   occasional   exceptions,   their   official   stance   on   religious  minorities,   including   Alawites,   was   rather   conciliatory.   On   democracy,   SILF  affiliates  adopted  positions  broadly  similar  to  that  of  the  Muslim  Brotherhood  by  combining  calls  for  the  implementation  of  sharia  with  support  for  a  competitive  electoral  system.59      All   SILF   affiliates   joined   General   Idris’   Supreme   Military   Council   in   December  2012,   and   maintained   relations   with   the   political   opposition   abroad   at   some  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Lund, Syrian Jihadism, p. 36; ‘Allush’s father ‘Abdallah is a traditional Salafi sheikh from Duma 
(Damascus) who was barred from any religious activity in the mid-1990s. He is now based in Saudi 
Arabia. 
59 ICG, Tentative Jihad, p. 18; Lund, Syrian Jihadism, p. 37. 
	  point.  Before  it  took  part  in  the  establishment  of  the  SILF,  Suqur  al-­‐Sham  was  the  leading   faction   within   the   Committee   for   the   Protection   of   Civilians,   a   front  organisation   of   the   Muslim   Brotherhood,   which   also   provided   Tawhid   with  financial   support.60      Before   the   creation   of   the   Islam   Brigade,   its   head   of  politburo   Muhammad   ‘Allush   was   a   member   of   the   Syrian   National   Council.61  SILF  affiliates  cautiously,  but  formally,  endorsed  the  Council  and/or  the  National  Coalition,62  and   Tawhid   commander   Salih   hosted   the   head   of   the   opposition’s  interim  government  Ghassan  Hitto  when  he  visited  Aleppo  in  March  2013.63      Like  for  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham,  but  to  a  much  greater  extent,  the  SILF’s  pragmatism  was  function  of  its  proximity  to  the  Qatar-­‐Turkey  axis.  Tawhid’s  endorsement  of  the  Coalition  and  interim  government  coincided  with  the  apex  of  Qatari  influence  on  the   political   opposition.   Al-­‐Faruq’s   northern   branch   was   relied   upon   by   the  Turkish   intelligence   to  guard   the  border,   an  experience   that   eventually  proved  unsuccessful  given  the  corruption  of  the  Syrian  insurgent  group.64    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Youtube, 4 September 2012, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UKay85etOVw; Lefèvre, ‘The 
Syrian Brotherhood’s Armed Struggle’. 
61 See his interview in the Salafi Haraki magazine al-Bayan, 1 March 2012, 
http://albayan.co.uk/article.aspx?id=1670. 
62 Lund, Syrian Jihadism, p. 37 and ‘Aleppo and the battle’; Osama al-Junaydi, interview on al-Jazeera. 
63 All4Syria, 24 March 2013, http://all4syria.info/Archive/76305. 
64 Interviews with a Syrian opponent, Istanbul, 7 January 2014.  
	  Like   the   SIF,   the   SILF   derived   the   bulk   of   its   private   funding   from   Gulf-­‐based  Haraki   Salafis.   However,   its  most   dedicated   supporters  were   not   the  Kuwaitis,  but   members   of   a   current   called   ‘Sururi’,   after   Syrian   ideologue   Muhammad  Surur  Zayn  al-­‐‘Abidin  (b.  1938),  the  tutelary  figure  of  Haraki  Salafism.  A  native  of  the   province   of   Der‘a,   Zayn   al-­‐‘Abidin   joined   the   Muslim   Brotherhood   before  going   into  exile   in  Saudi  Arabia   in  1965.  Although  he   left   the  kingdom   in  1973  and  relocated  successively  to  Kuwait,  Great  Britain,   Jordan  and,  recently,  Qatar,  he   left  a  durable   imprint  on   the  Saudi   Islamist   scene.  His  combination  of  Salafi  doctrines  and  Muslim  Brotherhood-­‐like  concerns  for  political  issues  was  a  major  source  of  inspiration  for  the  Sahwa  movement,  detailed  in  chapter  5  by  Stephane  Lacroix,  as  well  as  for  Kuwaiti  Harakis.65    For   most   of   his   career,   Zayn   al-­‐‘Abidin   did   not   display   much   interest   in   the  politics  of  his  homeland  and   rather  directed  his   criticisms  at   the   regime  of   the  country   in   which   he   had   most   of   his   admirers:   Saudi   Arabia.66  After   2011,  however,   the  Salafi   ideologue  capitalised  on  his  extensive  regional  networks   to  raise  funds  for  the  Syrian  opposition.  In  the  military  realm,  he  openly  expressed  his  preference  for  the  SILF,  claiming  that  the  latter  comprised  no  less  than  60  to  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Stéphane Lacroix, Awakening Islam. The Politics of Religious Dissent in Contemporary Saudi 
Araba, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011; Pall, Salafism in Lebanon, p. 81.  
66 Lacroix, Awakening Islam, p. 154-55. For a recent example, see interview with al-Hiwar TV, 9 
December 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oevC1vhwU7Y 
	  70%  of  all  rebel  fighters’.67  The  SILF  maintains  close  ties  with  the  Sham  Islamic  Committee  (hay’at  al-­‐sham  al-­‐islamiyya),  a  Sururi  humanitarian  and  missionary  organisation   whose   leaders   are   based   in   Saudi   Arabia   and   Bahrain. 68   The  Committee’s  operations   in  Syria,  which   included  providing   the  SILF  with  Salafi  booklets, 69   were   partly   funded   by   the   powerful   Qatari   ‘Id   Charitable  Foundation,70  a  major  patron  of  Haraki  Salafism  worldwide.71      Whereas   some   Kuwaiti   Harakis   have   radicalised   and   moved   closer   to   Jihadi  factions,   the   Sururis   have   firmly   remained   in   the   mainstream   and   therefore  constitute  a   factor  of  relative  moderation   for   the  groups  they  sponsor.  Zayn  al-­‐‘Abidin   and   his   followers   have   cooperated   with   mainstream   traditionalist  religious  scholars  within  organisations  such  as  the  League  of  the  Ulama  of  Sham  (2012)   and   the   Syrian   Islamic   Council   (2014).72  Zayn   al-­‐‘Abidin   expressed   his  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Interview on Al-Hiwar TV, 8 December 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PwpN-
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68 Lund, Syrian Jihadism, p. 37; interview with a member of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, Tunis, 10 
December 2012. 
69 SILF Facebook page, 9 March 2013. 
70 Video report, 2 February 2014, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8XnwCmTsSkA.  
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  opposition  to  the  presence  of  foreign  fighters73  and  the  Committee  issued  a  fatwa  legitimising  the  use  of  the  Syrian  national  flag  by  rebel  groups.74      The   Quietists’    Baptism   of   Fire:   The   Front   for   Authenticity   and  Development    Describing  Salafi  networks  that  actively  support  armed  struggle  as  ‘quietist’  may  seem  contradictory.  It  is  all  the  more  the  case  when  these  networks  are  centred  in  the  Kuwaiti  Association  for  the  Revival  of  the  Islamic  Heritage  (jam‘iyya  ihya’  al-­‐turath   al-­‐islami,   hereafter   al-­‐Turath),   whose   members   participated   in  parliamentary  elections  as  early  as  1981.75  However,   these  Salafis   are   ‘quietist’  to  the  extent  that  contrary  to  the  Jihadis  and  Harakis,  they  profess  unconditional  loyalty  to  incumbent  Muslim  regimes  and  in  particular  to  the  Saudi  monarchy.76  Consequently,  they  first  opposed  the  2011  uprisings  in  general,  but  on  Syria,  they  gradually  changed  their  mind  and  aligned  themselves  with  Riyadh’s  support  for  the   opposition.   The   best   illustration   of   that   U-­‐turn   was   certainly   the   case   of  Saudi-­‐based   Syrian   TV   preacher   ‘Adnan   al-­‐‘Ar‘ur:   a   couple   of   weeks   before  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73 Interview, al-Hiwar TV, 9 June 2011, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R0I-o_XQ7-M. 
74 Fatwa released on 13 May 2012, http://islamicsham.org/fatawa/275. 
75 Lahoud-Tatar, Islam et Politique, p. 113-17. 
76 Al-Turath initially had a Haraki component in the person of its influential Egyptian ideologue ‘Abd 
al-Rahman ‘Abd al-Khaliq. However, the latter’s expulsion from the association in the early 1990s was 
followed by a marked quietist turn (Pall, Salafism in Lebanon, p. 65-76). 
	  demonstrations   started   in   Syria,   he   was   still   ordering   Syrians   not   to   imitate  Tunisian   and   Libyan   revolutionaries;   a   few   months   later,   he   became   famous  thanks  to  a  pro-­‐revolution  weekly  programme  entitled  With  Syria  Until  Victory.77      When  the  Saudi  state  started  to  throw  its  weight  behind  Syrian  rebels  in  the  first  months  of  2012,   it  privileged  nationalist  defector  officers  over   Islamist   civilian  commanders  in  a  way  that  was  not  dissimilar  to  Riyadh’s  support  for  the  military  against   the   Muslim   Brotherhood   in   Egypt.78  Accordingly,   al-­‐‘Ar’ur   expressed  support  for  schemes  aimed  at  placing  the  insurgency  under  the  aegis  of  defector  officers,79  and  engaged  in  a  rhetorical  feud  with  Kuwaiti  Harakis  Shafi  and  Hajjaj  al-­‐‘Ajami,  whom  he  accused  of  sowing  division  and  extremism  by  bypassing  the  officers-­‐led  Military  Councils  in  favour  of  Islamist  factions.80  The  ‘Ajamis,  on  their  part,  replied  by  branding  the  Military  Councils  as  devices  used  by  Saudi  Arabia  and  the  US  to  prevent  funds  from  reaching  Salafi  battalions.81    
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78 Thomas Pierret, ‘External Support and the Syrian Insurgency’, Foreign Policy, 9 August 2013. 
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80 See for instance al-‘Ar’ur’s speech in a private mansion, 13 November 2012, 
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81 See Shafi al-‘Ajami’s interview on Khalijiyya TV, 11 July 2013, 
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  This  background  explains   the  contradictory   features  of   the  Saudi-­‐aligned  Salafi  coalition   established   in   November   2012,   the   Front   for   Authenticity   and  Development   (jabhat   al-­‐asala   wal-­‐tanmiya,   hereafter   FAD),   which   always  remained  a  lightweight  by  comparison  with  other  Salafi  coalitions.  The  backbone  of   the   front   is   the   humanitarian-­‐missionary   Association   of   the   People   of   the  Trace   (jam‘iyyat   ahl   al-­‐athar,   hereafter  Ahl   al-­‐Athar),   and   the   battalions   of   the  same  name.  Ahl   al-­‐Athar   itself   is   funded  by   al-­‐Turath,  whose  member   ‘Abd   al-­‐Mani‘  al-­‐‘Ajami   is   frequently  visiting  refugee  camps   in  Turkey.82  The  FAD   is   led  by  Khalid  al-­‐Hammad,  a  Turath-­‐affiliated  Syrian  cleric  based  in  the  emirate.      Given  the  lack  of  quietist  Salafi  infrastructure  in  Syria  before  2011,  the  FAD  had  to  recruit  a  heterogeneous  alliance  of  ex-­‐Jihadis  (Nur  al-­‐Din  Zanki  Battalions),83  early  defectors  of  Asad’s  military   (ex-­‐Faruq   leader   ‘Abd  al-­‐Rahman  Tlass),   and  tribesman  from  the  eastern  province  of  Deir  ez-­‐Zor.    The  FAD’s  alignment  on  the  Saudi  agenda  translated  into  a  moderate  outlook.  Its  name   is   reminiscent   of   that   of   post-­‐Islamist   parties,   its   platform  barely  makes  any  reference  to  Islam  or  even  to  any  kind  of  post-­‐Asad  political  ambition,84  and  its   visual   material   proudly   features   the   Syrian   flag.   Obvious   proximity   with  Riyadh  also  sparked  strong  suspicion  among  other  Salafi   factions,   to   the  extent  	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  that  FAD  leader  Khalid  al-­‐Hammad  felt  compelled  to  intervene  on  al-­‐‘Ar’ur’s  TV  programme  to  deny  his   front  was  a  Syrian  version  of   the   ‘Awakening  Councils’  set  up  by  the  US  army  in  Iraq  to  fight  the  Sunni  insurgency  during  the  previous  decade.85    Radical  Mainstream:  the  Islamic  Front    In  November  2013,  the  main  components  of  the  SIF  and  SILF  (minus  the  Faruq  Battalions,  which  had  disintegrated   in  previous  months  due   to   intra-­‐leadership  rivalries)  announced  their  merger  into  the  Islamic  Front  (al-­‐jabhat  al-­‐islamiyya,  IF).   The   move   had   been   announced   for   a   long   time   and   it   did   not   come   as   a  surprise   given   the   two   coalitions’   close   operational   cooperation   and   partly  overlapping   sources   of   external   support.   However,   the   unification   was   also   a  reflection  of  recent  developments.    The  first  of  these  developments  was  a  process  of  radicalisation  during  2013.  This  was,   to   a   large   extent,   the   product   of   the   increasingly   clear-­‐cut   sectarian  character  of   the  war,  as   the   first  half  of   the  year  witnessed   the  creation  by   the  regime  of  a  predominantly  Alawite  auxiliary  militia  called  the  National  Defence  Army,   as   well   as   the   massive   involvement   of   the   Lebanese   Hizbullah   in   the  conflict.  By  February,  the  Syrian  flag  had  disappeared  from  Suqur  al-­‐Sham’s  logo,  and  in  July,  Zahran  ‘Allush  released  a  video  message  featuring  virulent  sectarian  	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  content.86  Accordingly,   the   IF   platform   was   unprecedentedly   outspoken   in   its  demand   for   an   Islamic   state   and   rejection   of   democracy   and   secularism.   The  document  also  paid  homage  to  the  foreign  fighters  who  had  come  to  the  Syrian  people’s  rescue.87    This   radicalisation  coincided  with  a   shift  away   from  the  National  Coalition  and  FSA.   In   September   2013,   future   IF   members   had   associated   with   al-­‐Nusra   to  proclaim   their   rejection   of   the   National   Coalition,88  and   the   creation   of   the   IF  itself  followed  failed  Qatar-­‐brokered  negotiations  with  the  FSA  in  which  Islamist  factions  asked  for  a  reform  of  the  FSA  command  that  would  give  them  significant  influence.89  These  moves  were  driven  by  a  complex  combination  of  factors:  Saudi  Arabia’s   takeover   of   the   National   Coalition   in   July,  which   encouraged   Qatar   to  retaliate   through   its   partners   among   armed   groups;90  bitter   disappointment   at  the  Obama  administration’s   failure   to   respond  militarily   to   the  use  of   chemical  weapons   by   the   Syrian   regime   in   August,   striking   a   devastating   blow   to   the  standing   of   the   Western-­‐backed   National   Coalition   and   FSA;   and   the   need   to  
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  bolster   the   Islamist   credentials   of   mainstream   Salafi   factions   in   a   context   of  looming  conflict  with  ISIS.    In  Saudi  Arabia,   the  establishment  of   the   IF  was  hailed  by  major   figures  of   the  Sahwa   like   Salman   al-­‐‘Awda   and   Nasir   al-­‐‘Umar,91  who   had   hitherto   refrained  from  vowing  support  for  specific  insurgent  fronts  in  Syria.  More  surprisingly,  the  IF  also  received  warm  support  from  ‘Adnan  al-­‐‘Ar‘ur.  Since  early  2013,  the  latter  had   been   promoting   the   Islam   Brigade   in   his   TV   show,92  and   had   gradually  renounced  to  support  the  FSA’s  shaky  structures.  In  September,  ‘Allush’s  group,  soon   renamed   the   ‘Army   of   Islam’,   took   the   lead   of   an   operation   room  established  with   funds  provided  by   al-­‐‘Ar‘ur   and   the  Turath-­‐aligned  Council   of  the   Backers   of   the   Syrian   Revolution   in   Kuwait.   The   latter   was   chaired   by  Muhammad  Hayif   al-­‐Mutayri,   a   former  MP  of   the  Salafi  Gathering   (al-­‐tajammu‘  al-­‐salafi),  al-­‐Turath’s  parliamentary  wing.93  Although  the  FAD  apparently  hoped  
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  that   ‘Turathi’  money  could  be  used  to  convince  the  Army  of  Islam  to  rally  to  its  own  ranks,94  ‘Allush  remained  loyal  to  the  SILF  and  IF.      The  long-­‐standing  ties  of   ‘Allush’s  father  with  the  Saudi  religious  establishment  probably  facilitated  this  realignment,95  but  the  move  also  reflected  a  partial  shift  in  the  Saudi  strategy.96  In  light  of  the  FSA’s  poor  performance,  at  least  one  of  the  kingdom’s   decision-­‐making   centres   (probably   Prince   Bandar   bin   Sultan’s  intelligence)   considered   that  no  progress  on   the   southern   front   could  be  made  without   cooperating   with   the   most   powerful   rebel   group   in   Damascus.   Saudi  support  for  the  Army  of  Islam  was  also  said  to  be  a  means  to  keep  ISIS  in  check  around   the   Syrian   capital.97  Showing   support   for   the   Army   of   Islam   may   also  have  been  a  means  to  offset  the  resentment  generated  among  Saudi  Islamists  by  Riyadh’s  backing  of  the  July  2013  coup  in  Egypt.      It  should  be  noted  that  Saudi  support  for  the  Army  of  Islam  did  not  amount  to  an  embrace  of  the  IF  as  a  whole,  as  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham  –  the  dominant  force  in  the  front  -­‐  was  still  not  deemed  acceptable  in  Riyadh.  Qatar  and  Turkey  therefore  remained  the   chief   source   of   support   for   the   IF,   as   suggested   by   a   20   January   2014  	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95 Website of the late Saudi Mufti ‘Abd al-‘Aziz bin Baz, http://www.binbaz.org.sa/mat/10231.  
96 See Muhammad ‘Allush’s interview in the Saudi daily al-Sharq al-Awsat, 12 November 2013. 
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  statement  in  which  the  latter  praised  the  role  of  the  two  aforementioned  states,  but  failed  to  mention  Saudi  Arabia.98  It  is  Qatar  which,  in  following  May,  helped  Ahrar   al-­‐Sham   escape   renewed   threats   of   US   blacklisting   by   securing   IF’s  signature  on   the  Honour  Charter   (mithaq   sharaf),   a   document   in  which   Syrian  rebel   factions   expressed   their   rejection   of   foreign   fighters   and   transnational  jihad,   and   called   for   a   “state   of   justice,   law   and   liberties”   rather   than   for   an  Islamic  state.99    Support  for  one  of  the  IF’s  components  by  Saudi-­‐aligned  Salafis  did  not  mark  the  end  of  their  feud  with  the  Kuwaiti  Harakis.  On  the  contrary,  al-­‐‘Ar‘ur  stepped  up  his  attacks  against  Hajjaj  and  Shafi  al-­‐‘Ajami  by  blaming  them  for  their  support  for  the  insurgency’s  most  radical  fringe.100  Indeed,  in  a  further  illustration  of  the  ongoing  realignments  between  rebel  factions  and  external  networks  of  supports,  the   ‘Ajamis   had   been   increasingly   open   concerning   their   financial   backing   of  Jihadi  outfits:  Shafi  boasted  about  the  fact  that  his  operation  rooms  in  Syria  made  ‘no  discrimination  between  al-­‐Nusra  and  the  other  groups’,101  and  pictures  were  circulated  on  social  networks  showing  Hajjaj  in  company  with  members  of  Suqur  al-­‐‘Izz,   an   independent   Jihadi   group   led   by   Saudi   volunteers,102  as  well   as  with  	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  Chechen   ISIS   commander   Abu   ‘Umar   al-­‐Shishani.103  In   August   2014,   the   two  ‘Ajamis  were  targeted  by  US  sanctions  on  the  basis  of  their  support  for  terrorist  organisations.104    An  even  more  spectacular  case  of  conversion  of  a  relatively  established  figure  to  Jihadi  romanticism  was  that  of   the  Saudi  Abdallah  al-­‐Muhaysini.  The  son  of   the  head  of   the   religious  police   in   the  Burayda  and  himself   a  popular  preacher,   al-­‐Muhaysini  left  his  mosque  in  Mecca  and  relocated  among  the  mujahidin  in  Syria.  From  there,  he  called  for  the  unity  of  all  Syrian  Salafi  factions,  including  al-­‐Nusra  and  ISIS,  and  raised  funds  for  them  through  representatives  based  in  Kuwait  and  Qatar.  Whereas  al-­‐‘Ar‘ur  and  his  likes  were  seeing  the  IF  as  a  bulwark  against  the  rise   of   Jihadi   hardliners,   al-­‐Muhaysini   expressed   hopes   that   the   new   umbrella  organisation   would   move   out   of   the   mainstream   by   absorbing   al-­‐Qaeda’s  offspring   in   Syria.105  In   early   2014,   however,   the   all-­‐out   war   that   broke   out  between  ISIS  and  the  rest  of   the  rebellion  dealt  a   fatal  blow  to  that  ecumenical  project.    Countdown  to  Armageddon:  the  Islamic  State  in  Iraq  and  Sham  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 ICG, Anything But Politics: The State of Syria’s Political Opposition, Middle East Report 146, 17 
October 2013, p. 13. 
104 “Treasury designates three key supporters of terrorists in Syria and Iraq”, 6 Auust 2014, 
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2605.aspx.	  
105 Thomas Joscelyn, ‘Popular Saudi cleric endorses Islamic Front, calls for cooperation with al 
Qaeda’, Long War Journal, 14 December 2013. 
	    In   April   2013,   ISI   leader   Abu   Bakr   al-­‐Baghdadi   proclaimed   the   merger   of   his  organisation  with   its  Syrian   ‘extension’  al-­‐Nusra   in  order  to   form  ISIS.  Al-­‐Jolani  opposed   that  decision  and,   in  order   to  bolster  his   legitimacy,   officially  pledged  allegiance  to  Ayman  al-­‐Zawahiri,  who  ruled  against  the  merger.106      Al-­‐Baghdadi’s  decision  must  be   analysed   in   the   light  of   his   chief   strategic   goal,  which   was   not   to   topple   the   Syrian   regime   but,   as   ISIS’   name   indicates,   to  establish  a  state  in  the  power  vacuum  spanning  from  Western  Iraq  to  Northern  Syria.  Yet,   by  April  2013,   two  developments  were   threatening   that  project:   the  first  was  al-­‐Nusra’s  participation   in   the  governance  of   liberated  areas  on  a  par  with  other  rebel  factions  rather  than  as  the  exclusive  power  holder;  the  second  were  attempts  by  the  National  Coalition  and  a  newly  formed  interim  government  at  rebuilding  administrative  and  police  structures  in  liberated  areas,  in  addition  to  General  Idris’  efforts  to  reorganise  the  FSA.      ISIS’  project  of  state-­‐building  is,  of  course,  an  idiosyncratic  one,  as  demonstrated  by  the  proclamation  of  the  Caliphate  by  the  group  (now  renamed  “Islamic  State”)  following  its  June  2014  successful  offensive  in  Iraq.  Given  Syria’s  importance  in  the  eschatological  tradition  of  Islam,  this  project  is  arguably  imbued  with  quasi-­‐millenarian   expectations   in   the   eyes   of   many   followers   of   the   group.   Even  
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  without   that,   al-­‐Baghdadi’s   ‘state’   provides   Salafis   across   the   world   with   the  opportunity  to  perform  the  hijra  (emigration)  to  a  place  where,  in  the  absence  of  a  competing  state  authority,   the   laws  of  God  can  be   fully   implemented  without  resorting   to   the   unholy   compromises   that   characterise   the   usual   conduct   of  political   affairs.   This   extreme   purism   probably   explains   why   ISIS   has   proved  more   appealing   than   al-­‐Nusra   among   foreign   volunteers.   Among   ISIS   fighters,  initial  anxiety  about  the  vulnerability  of  such  a  unique  experience  translated  into  a   paranoid   view   of   the   outside   world   (including   other   rebels)   that   was  manifested   in  Takfiri   tendencies,   that   is,   in  a  propensity  to  excommunicate  any  dissenter.      Such   is   the  background  that  helps  making  sense  of  a  strategy  that  has  not  only  been   largely   disconnected   from   the   goals   of   the   Syrian   revolution,   but   also  profoundly   detrimental   to   the   latter.   Although   ‘Da‘esh’   (a   derogatory   acronym  used  by  ISIS’  detractors)  tried  and  sometimes  managed  to  secure  some  popular  support   by   allying   with   tribes,107  carrying   out   outreach   activities   and   fighting  criminality  with   an   iron   fist,   it   also   alienated   large   segments   of   the  population  through  summary  executions  of  ‘blasphemers’  and  war  prisoners,  desecration  of  churches  and  Sufi  mausoleums,  as  well  as  arrests  and  abduction  of  civil  society  activists,  (Syrian  and  foreign)  journalists,  and  local  notables.      
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  At  the  military  level,  ISIS  focused  on  the  consolidation  of  its  hold  over  liberated  areas  in  the  north  and  east  of  the  country  at  the  expense  of  direct  confrontation  with   the   regime   at   least   until   the   summer   of   2014.   One   year   before   that,   the  group  assassinated  a  prominent  FSA  commander  in  Latakia,  then  turned  against  FSA  units  across  the  country.  In  that  context,  the  group’s  particular  focus  on  the  control  of  border  towns  (Jrablus,  Dana,  A‘zaz)  raised  fears  that   it  was  trying  to  cut  off  the  insurgents’  supply  lines  with  Turkey.      ISIS’  aggressiveness  was  not  reserved  for  the  ‘secular’,  ‘Western-­‐backed’  FSA.  In  October  2013,   it  abducted  al-­‐Nusra’s  emir   in  Raqqa  Abu  Sa‘ad  al-­‐Hadrami,  who  had  secured  the  rallying  of  former  FSA  brigades  that  were  seeking  his  protection  against   ISIS.108  Throughout   the   autumn,   the   execution   of   several   members   of  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham  by  ISIS  gradually  deepened  the  rift  between  the  two  factions.109  In  the   Islamist   Twittersphere,   ISIS   partisans   were   increasingly   branded   as  ‘Kharijites’,  in  reference  to  an  extreme  school  of  thought  of  early  Islamic  history.    The   showdown   eventually   came   in   January   2014   and   pitted   ISIS   against   FSA  affiliates,   the   Army   of   the   Mujahidin   (a   recently   created   moderate   Islamist  alliance  comprising  FAD  units),  the  IF  and  al-­‐Nusra.  ISIS  initially  suffered  severe  	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  setbacks,   as   it   had   to   evacuate  most   of   its   positions   in   the   provinces   of   Idlib,  Aleppo  (except  for  the  eastern  part)  and  Deir  ez-­‐Zor  in  order  to  consolidate   its  defences   in   Raqqa,   from  which   it   expelled   all   rival   factions.   In   addition   to   the  demise  of  its  no.  2  and  reported  strongmen  Hajji  Bakr,  the  group  also  lost  much  of   its  support  among  the  transnational   Jihadi  sphere.  Even  the  best   intentioned  mediators  were  appalled  by  ISIS’  refusal  of  arbitration  by  an  independent  sharia  court,   a   stance   justified   by   the   fact   that   a   ‘state’   cannot   accept   such   an  infringement  upon   its   sovereignty.110  Al-­‐Muhaysini  himself   lost  hope  when   ISIS  conditioned   the   acceptance   of   his   peace   initiative   on   the   other   rebel   groups’  excommunication   of   the   National   Coalition,   FSA,   Qatar   and   Saudi   Arabia.   Al-­‐Baghdadi   was   also   disavowed   by   Jihadi   luminaries   like   Abu   Muhammad   al-­‐Maqdisi  and  Abu  Qatada,  and  eventually  by  al-­‐Zawahiri  himself.111      Conclusion    The   post-­‐2011   Syrian   Salafi   scene   was   initially   shaped   by   the   action   of   three  main  transnational  alignments.  The  nexus  constituted  by  al-­‐Nusra  and  its  mother  organisation   ISI   seized   the   opportunities   offered   by   the   Syrian   uprising   to  revitalise  the  Jihadi  project,  with  a  fundamental  ambiguity  that  would  later  spark  the   al-­‐Nusra-­‐ISIS   conflict:   whereas   ISIS’   efforts   have   been   aimed   at   the  
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  immediate   establishment   of   a   Caliphal   state,   al-­‐Nusra   has   behaved   as   a   ‘mere’  Islamist  movement  building  the  bases  of  its  future  influence.      Although   partially   rooted   in   pre-­‐2011   Jihadi   networks,   the   axis   formed   by   the  SIF-­‐SILF/IF  can  be  characterised  as  ‘Haraki’  because  of  its  relatively  conciliatory  approach   to   dealing   with   non-­‐Salafi   actors   in   the   opposition,   and   overt  cooperation   with   regional   states,   namely   Qatar   and   Turkey.   A   combination   of  ideological  coherence  and  pragmatism  put  this  axis  on  top  of  the  insurgency  until  mid-­‐2014,  when  the  IF  was  weakened  by  internal  rivalries  (essentially  between  the   Army   of   Islam   and   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham),   loss   of   economic   assets   to   ISIS   in   the  eastern  provinces,  growing  restrictions  on  private  fundraising  in  Gulf  countries,  and  above  all,   the  decimation  of  Ahrar  al-­‐Sham’s   leadership  (including   ‘Abbud)  in  a  September  2014  bomb  attack.    Quiestist,  Saudi-­‐aligned  Salafis  have  suffered  from  the  inherent  contradictions  of  the   Saudi   strategy,   as   they   had   to   back   the   least   Islamic   segment   of   the  insurgency   (defector   officers),   before   throwing   their   weight   behind   the  somewhat   heteroclite   FAD,   whose   modest   performances   prompted   a   partial  reorientation   towards  a  more   robust   element  of   the  Haraki  nexus,  namely,   the  Army  of  Islam.      Convergence  towards  the  centre,  that  is  the  Haraki  segment,  was  also  witnessed  at  the  other  end  of  the  Salafi  spectrum  with  the  temporary  ‘normalisation’  of  al-­‐
	  Nusra.  In  Deir  ez-­‐Zor  for  instance,  al-­‐Nusra’s  cooperation  with  mainstream  rebel  factions  (including  the  FSA)  to  prevent  the  return  of  ISIS  to  the  province  during  the  summer  and  spring  of  2014  went  as  far  as  a  total  merger  into  the  so-­‐called  Consultative   Council   of   the   Mujahidin   of   the   Eastern   Region. 112   This  unprecedented   experience   was   rapidly   put   to   an   end   by   ISIS’   capture   of   the  province  in  July,  a  failure  that  weakened  al-­‐Nusra’s  inclusivist  wing  (Abu  Mariya  al-­‐Qahtani)  in  favour  of  its  more  exclusivist  counterpart  (Sami  al-­‐‘Uraydi).113      By   the   time   of   updating   this   chapter,   in   early   October   2014,   Syria’s   Salafi  insurgency   is   witnessing   a   new   watershed   moment   due   to   the   quasi-­‐simultaneous   assassination   of   much   of   Ahrar   al-­‐Sham’s   leadership,   and   the  beginning  of  the  US-­‐led  bombing  campaign  against  the  Syrian  bases  of  ISIS  and,  to  a   lesser  extent,   Jabhat  al-­‐Nusra.  The   future   is  more  unpredictable   than  ever,  but  one  can  reasonably  expect  Syrian  Salafi   factions  to  show  at   least  as   flexible  and  adaptable  in  the  years  to  come  as  they  proved  to  be  since  2011.    Bibliography    All  websites  were  last  accessed  on  10  March  2014.    
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